Terrorism Discussion V2

That was the entire impetus and the eventual failure of the Oil for Food programs.
You cannot guarantee proper use of financial aide when Terrorist or Totalitarian factions control the government.


Does that sound like President Bush?
I?m not quite sure, although I do wish he?d simply increase troop-levels and take the gloves off with the insurgents and Iran.

For instance, why is Al Sadr still alive? We should have deported him to Guantanamo in 2003, tried him as an enemy combatant, and have him quietly executed November 5, 2008.

If he is imprisoned in extremis for a long-period of time he becomes a failed insurgent, not a honorific terrorist martyr.

Simply get it done, fast.

 

Good points about the accountability and oversight of economic aid that would be needed.

As for getting rid of Al-Sadr, I would've done just the opposite. I would've appointed him to a high position in the Iraqi regime.

Seduce him with political power. It worked on Gerry Adams of the IRA.

 

IceHawk, you continually point to Tet as proof the US can beat the snot outta guerilla forces, confusing terrorists with superpower funded Marxists and ignoring the bigger picture selectively.

That's why I never, ever claimed you can eliminate terrorism, and I pity people who think terrorism can be wiped out (I especially pity the people who think it can be wiped out with the military, as I think that's a foolish notion).

I said it was symptomatic of the modern age. It is.

My thinking isn't about stopping future Usama bin Ladens. It's stopping the people who will sign up to his cause and die for him. UBL isn't dangerous on his own. He's dangerous when he has followers who will carry out his plans. If you take that away from him..?

And how would I ensure the funding was spent properly? Excellent question, and I guess the best answer is conditional aid. Saudi Arabia is hugely dependant on the United States for several forms of aid, most notably military and intelligence. Linking that to development goals, as in tangible, quantifiable goals.

You don't develop X,Y and Z by 2008, we cut X% off your aid, etc etc.

Good idea re: Gerry Adams, Shane.

E_S

 

I'm completely serious. You make hima politician, and he will have a whole new set of incentives to remain a politician and not a radical with a private militia.

It is cynical, yes. But sometimes...

 

No, I agree with you and think it is one of those inspired ideas our leaders won't submit to.

E_S

 

Wrong. The way Iraq seems to be going he would be politician with a private militia. In fact he has achieved that status without US help.

 

DarthKarde;

We're talking ont he assumption that Iraq hasn't been administered with ham-fists.

An "alternate reality" where neoconservatism never existed, much less drove foreign policy; and where cool heads prevailed and reason was god.

E_S

 

From 1960 well through into 1965 the main forces opposing and engaging American soldiers were the Viet Cong, employing guerilla tactics almost exclusively. A large portion of the Viet Cong field strength came from recruited peasants that were growing increasingly dissatisfied with the South Vietnamese government.

Viet Cong forces fought in lightly armed hit-and-fade units, attempting to ambush ARVN and US military patrols and outposts. They avoided at all cost any frontal assault on conventional ARVN or US units in strength and did their utmost to avoid the superior fire-power of American air power.

The Iraqi Insurgents, at least those in the Anbar provinces, are mostly former Republican Guard members, drawing man and material from what was the fourth largest armed force on the planet.

The VC and the Iraqi Insurgents are not incomparably different.

They use almost identical tactics for god?s sake, read the historical accounts.

 

And how would I ensure the funding was spent properly? Excellent question, and I guess the best answer is conditional aid. Saudi Arabia is hugely dependant on the United States for several forms of aid, most notably military and intelligence. Linking that to development goals, as in tangible, quantifiable goals.

You don't develop X,Y and Z by 2008, we cut X% off your aid, etc etc.

Which is interesting that you would post this, considering you've criticized this type of aid anywhere else. Unless I've missed something, are you proposing that Saudi Arabia is a special case?

I'm not against the idea myself, but the main problem with conditional aid is the now famous concept of blowback. (even though originally, it had a different connotation) If the Saudi's, or any country for that matter, are subject to conditions, then there is a real chance that they will find aid somewhere else. The process of applying conditions often results in a game of "aid brinksmanship," and the country offering the conditions has to be ready to accept this.

During the Cold War, this is exactly what drove large areas of the Middle East into the Soviet sphere, until the Soviets used them up and discarded them. It's also a central theme that applies to the PLO, along with many other examples.

I'm just surprised that you would suggest it.

 

I have never criticised it and as a neoliberal remain firmly in favour of conditional aid.

The thread from early last year on neoliberalism was peppered with references by me to the necessity of conditional aid as a fiscal responsibility tool, as giving money with no conditions attached is partially our response to Africa. Ultimately, I feel, the more development we have, the greater access to wealth the citizens of that country have (which is great for int'l peace and stability).

I'm not sure where you got the idea I opposed conditional aid. Unless you're talking my response to the US' policy on Thailand, which I categorised as an unneccessary overreaction?

E_S

 

Maybe I just lumped it in with your new emphasis on "whatever the US does is wrong mode.."

The point is that attaching conditions to foreign aid might end up making the situation worse in the short term, while shifting any goals to the long term. The body attaching the conditions has to be prepared for this.

As a complete hypothetical, imagine if the US started attaching conditions to Saudi aid, and in response, the Saudis formed a collective with Syria? It's a stretch, but I want to focus on the potential reaction that such a move would generate. In such a situation, the international community would jump all over the US as a policy failure. I could hear the protest cries now "Who is the US to tell the Saudis how to run their country?" or "The US drove the Saudis to terrorism!"

But we know it wouldn't be that simple. By shifting away from the US, the Saudis sacrafice capability and gain some instability. It is always a trade-off for both sides.

Conditional aid has to be handled very precisely, and in almost all cases has to proceed slowly. How would US interests collide with Suadi interests, and how quickly would the Saudi government be willing to install changes that would put the spotlight on their own regime?

Using conditional aid to reduce terrorism means that one has to be willing to take a chance.

 

What blanket "US = wrong", like applauding the US' lead on North Korea?

E_S

 

Yeah, just like that, you...you..USaphobe....

 

Shouldn't that be USAtanophobe?

E_S

 

Yankophobe.

 

Assuming that's true for the sake of argument, the war in Vietnam was also unwinnable. What exactly do you hope to gain by making this comparison?

 

It's obvious; even though on a purely isolated, numerically constrained review of the Tet Offensive that because America killed more thant he VC killed, the war on terror is winnable, and thus Iraq, as a clear war on terror front, is winnable.

And as such, we were vindicated devoting resources to Iraq, since there are clearly terrorists in Iraq.

E_S

 

I'm far from sure that this should be taken at face value but it is concerning.

The evolving threat of al-Qaeda

 

I will characterize my own arguments if you don?t mind Ender and I will once again say, my point was that tactically insurgency groups cannot face-off with conventional military forces without taking massive casualties.

Tet devastated the VC, killing half of their army and forcing the NVA to take center-stage, I?d say that was significant.

Ergo, insurgency groups knowing full-well that they cannot engage military forces head-on will avoid such confrontations all together, as we are seeing in Iraq.

Ergo, if the insurgency groups will not fight conventional battles, it is my contention that the American military should engage in Filipno/Nicuraguan/Mexican-like pacification strategies to defeat the Iraqi insurgency on a tactical military-level.

You know what my point was and you ignored it to create a meager strawman about Vietnam.




And you have yet to explain how your Benevolent Social Welfare programs are going to disband the tens of thousands of insurgent militants currently active in Iraq Ender.

For instance, I knew we should have captured or killed Al-Sadr and decimated his millitia.
The Mahdi militia has now seized control of Amarah, destroyed three police stations, and are acting as the local authority.

I take it, Ender, that if we offer al-Sadr and his militia good jobs they?d be willing to give the city back, because having to fight them for control is a failure of policy, right?

 

Unfounded statement.
And as I said it was Ender's comparison that there are strategic comparisons, not mine, ask him.

The war was not won, that says nothing about the ability to win these types of wars. (ref; Phillipines, Nicuraga, Cuba, Korea...)

 

Ender Sai, you don't even have a grasp over foreign policy. Your views are polluted with your own views of the world. You don't see the fact that the people who are trying to beat the "insurgents" are going about it as if they are intentionally putting targets all over Iraq. The recent upsurge of violence in Iraq supports the view that the insurgents aren't fighting for money, if it was money they wanted, insurgents would have flocked back to te US HQ after Saddam was ousted to become local police and military again.

I am not even going to comment against what you counter this with if it has anything to do with your past irrelevant theories.

 

*waits for the ban*

 

Quellonis,

LOL. I work in IR. You don't. I have a masters in IR. You don't.

But, better luck next time!

E_S

 

Simply because I'm a History-Major does that mean I am never wrong about Historical events of significance?

Obviously not...

Appeal to Authority...

Education is imaterial to the validty of your agruments, as well you know.

Better Luck Next Time.

 

You guys!