Senate The rise of populism on the left and right - 1920s part 2?

To go back to this point I'd say a lost link to the 30's and 40's is a key issue but IMHO mostly not in the respect that seems to be ment here, I think the lost link is actually in the establishment and dates back to the rise of Reagan/Thatcher in the early 80's.

The collective memory of the horrors of WW2 I think remains pretty strong with much of the population as its place in popular culture remains high, ultimately of course horrors like the holocaust were always something most of the western population experienced indirectly so there's not much change there. You look at society as a whole and really is it more racist today than it was in the post war era? I think quite clearly not and indeed someone like Trump actually did less well with white voters than Romney 4 years ago and won with a combination of rust belt voters who voted Obama in 2008-12 plus a higher percentage of latino voters.

What were really seeing is the collapse of an establishment that for years has looked to lock together neo liberal economics and outward social liberalism and the idea that you must be against the latter if you oppose the former. By the 80's I think this establishment had either forgotten the lesson of the 30's and 40's or perhaps more often was suffering from a massive dose of hubris that it had advanced beyond them, see Gordon Browns claims of "an end to boom and bust". A large part of that hubris as well was I think based on its own shift towards simplified sound bite and personality based publicity, this isn't something that's suddenly appeared with Trump, UKIP, etc but has been on the rise for years. Someone like Trump would not be able to have the success he has attacking political correctness and identity politics if these things had not been so clearly used to prop up a system that was fundamentally based on a rise in inequality.

Another big issue as well I would say is that a lot of the strength of the establishment depended on an appeal to authority, it was the only option for running such a complex world and it had listened to all sides and taken a reasonable position. Its failure in so many respects during the 00's but most obviously the GFC has really shaken this plus I would argue the idea that it represents the "intelligent moderate" position has also been badly shaken. Post 2008 the desire to protect those at the top of the old system has ment that its publicity and attendant media has become increasingly desperate and willing to bend the truth really exposing that it was never truly inclusive and moderate in the first place but always in the service of the rich and the powerful.

In terms of rising "extremism" on the left as well I think we need to consider the actual positions being taken. The likes of Corbyn and Sanders are clearly not communists and in reality there positions are actually not as far to the left economically as mainstream politics were in the 50's to the 70's, they simply reveal just how far to the right we've shifted over the last 3+ decades. You can obviously see this revealed in the men themselves who aren't young firebrands but rather products of the pre Reagan/Thatcher era. That both of them have also been attacked strongly with PC politics again has badly damaged its credibility and revealed it to be a largely empty tool to much of the establishment.

 

Rylo Ken

 

Yes:

http://www.vox.com/world/2016/12/4/13833796/austria-presidential-election-2016-hofer-van-der-bellen

 

Now, if only America's Democrats could grow a backbone and do the same thing.

 

Tell that to Hillary "I'm happy to call it radical Islamic terrorism!" Clinton.

 

You're going to love Tulsi "2020" Gabbard.

 

It was very honorable how she stood against blood thirsty candidates and internal Democratic corruption while supporting Bernie Sanders in this last election cycle. Hopefully she can continue to do good things.

 

I love the irony in this. Factually, he's correct, but...

https://www.theguardian.com/politic...ght-are-parasites-feeding-on-peoples-concerns

"The populist right are “political parasites feeding on people’s concerns and worsening conditions”, Jeremy Corbyn has told a gathering of European socialist and progressive parties."

As opposed to the populist left, who are also political parasites feeding on people's concerns and worsening conditions, only with less divisive rhetoric.

"“They are political parasites feeding on people’s concerns and worsening conditions, blaming the most vulnerable for society’s ills instead of offering a way for taking back real control of our lives from the elites who serve their own interests,” he said."

Irony is supreme here; attacking populism with populism. META AF JEZZA.

 

Well, it was a huge surprise, and relief, when the first projection was announced yesterday showing Van der Bellen winning comfortably. Still, the demographics are the same as elsewhere, education and gender the deciders. Luckily, women and better educated voters had the better turnout.

 

Okay, so I'm probably gonna get blasted for this, but what is the problem with calling them 'radical Islamic terrorists'? I know in the American context there is the problem of being pressured by the far-right to use the term since it wasn't how Obama chose to name the issue (which I also think is fine), but all the leaders in Europe (including Merkel and Hollande) use that phrase. Daesh are after-all radical Islamic terrorists.

 

This simple graph perfectly illustrates the gender difference in the Austrian election:


In other European news Renzi lost the constitutional reform referendum, not sure what's going to happen now. (new elections? new government?)

 

http://www.afr.com/brand/boss/three...l-institutions-rachel-botsman-20170507-gvzsc4

For those unsettled by the rapid pace of technological change, Rachel Botsman does not have a soothing message. A global expert on the collaborative economy, Botsman says we are at the beginning of a monumental shift in who and what our society places its faith in.
“We are at the start of one of the biggest trust revolutions in history,” the author, consultant and columnist for BOSStold a recent ASIC (Ender note: Australian Securities and Investment Commission. Industry regulator - like an SEC, but functional) conference. Botsman’s second book, Who Can You Trust?, will be available in October.
A shift in trust from institutions back to individuals reverses the historical trend and has profound implications for society and business. Back when we all lived in small communities, individuals were known and trusted based on their behaviour. To scale trust, she says, we invented institutions, regulations and risk mechanisms such as insurance.
People stopped needing to trust each other directly and trust started to flow through these institutions. But technology has created new dynamics, forcing institutions to be more transparent, revealing their flaws. At the same time, it has enabled the trust that used to exist between individuals to be scaled globally, allowing new businesses to be built.

Botsman defines trust as “a confident relationship to the unknown”. It gives people confidence to place their faith in strangers and systems. Just like money is the currency for transactions, trust is the currency for interactions. “Trust is what actually enables society to keep moving forward; trust is what enables innovation to happen. Trust is the conduit that enables new ideas to travel.”

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Twilight of the elites

There are three somewhat overlapping reasons for why trust in institutions is collapsing, says Botsman.
The first is inequality of accountability – certain people are punished while others get a leave pass. The GFC left a toxic legacy, especially in the US, where bank leaders whose excessive risk-taking brought the global financial system to the brink of collapse did not face legal proceedings.
The second is the twilight of the elites and authority. Influence has inverted. Voters who backed Brexit said that they no longer trust experts, and trusted the person on the bus more than academics and economists.



The third reason is the fact that technology, and the shift in the way information is mediated, is creating echo chambers that affirm our existing views and amplify our fears.
A bigger realisation is “institutional trust wasn’t designed for the digital age; institutional trust was invented largely during the industrial revolution. It wasn’t designed for the age of drones and the internet of things and blockchains and artificial intelligent machines and the sharing economy,” says Botsman. “It wasn’t designed for an era of radical transparency, where if you are a CEO, a politician, you have to act as if you are behind glass, and to try to hide anything is really a high-stakes gamble.
“It wasn’t designed for an age of Alibaba or Amazon or Uber or Airbnb, where supply and demand can find one another, where people can transact directly on platforms, cutting out lots of traditional intermediaries. It wasn’t designed for an era where we’ve become dependent on information powerhouse platforms like Facebook and Google that are becoming network monopolies.
“And it wasn’t designed for an era where we think we are entitled to control everything, from how we get a ride to how we get a date, with a click, a swipe and a tap on our phones.”



‘More transparency needed’

Now, what Botsman calls “distributed trust” flows horizontally, rather than vertically upwards. Trust and influence now lie more with family, friends, classmates, colleagues and even strangers, than top-down with elites, authorities and institutions.
“Distributed trust is actually taking us back to this old village model, but today the community is at a global scale … it’s controlled largely by the invisible waves that are being pulled by these internet giants.
“I don’t think trust just disappears. It’s kind of like energy, it just transfers,” explains Botsman.



The consequences of this trust shift, both good and bad, cannot be underestimated. Institutional trust will continue to unravel and collapse.
Botsman says institutions have a twofold challenge to adapt to the new age and regain credibility and confidence. They must become more transparent, inclusive, dynamic and personalised. They must work with new business models and behaviours to maximise benefits and minimise potential problems. And when they break the rules, “there has to be penalties, there has to be loss of power, position and pride”.
Ultimately, for Botsman, even bigger questions are at play. What’s happening is not just a technological and business model revolution, but a social and cultural one.
“It’s about us, and that’s why the questions we need to be raising are ethical, not technical questions, and that’s why it matters that we get it right.”



Innovation fills a vaccuum

When institutional systems don't exist, or evaporate, innovation happens.
Shivani Siroya was working for the United Nations Population Fund in Africa when she became obsessed with how to create financial identities for 1.5 billion people who have no credit history, but who did have access to cell phones.
She realised the digital data from their phones could create a trail that assessed credit worthiness.
Using algorithms, artificial intelligence and over 10,000 data points, she figured out that if an individual uses first names and last names for more than 40 per cent of your contacts, has six people in their network that they're regularly in touch with by phone and more than 58 contacts that they regularly interact with, they are credit worthy.
In turn, this allowed her to create an assessment tool that allowed her to finance microlending.
The company she founded, Tala, now makes micro-loans in Kenya (where it is the fifth most-downloaded app), Tanzania and the Philippines. Users describe it as a financial partner, not a bank.
Shiroya's approach typifies the focus of many entrepreneurs, says Botsman: "They are so focused on what people need, they don't care about existing infrastructure, and they see a way around traditional regulation."



"This illustrates an opportunity of how we're living in this unique moment in time [where we can] redesign institutional systems that are more transparent, more inclusive and more accountable."

 

I reallly like this piece, and it presents a really interesting challenge to the idea of the mob knowing best.

This was posted to the wall of an Australian media commentator, and of course the populists instantly took to it to defend their populism (missing the commentator's point in sharing it). Of course, one prole imbecile said, people are more inclined to listen to the bus driver than the economist or academic (note: neither were really the point of this article, but I notice a lot with media, particular the Guardian, people respond to the headline more than the article) because the bus driver didn't lie.

Reinforcing the risks posed by echo chambers. Firstly, there's a reason they're driving a bus and not lecturing in economics somewhere. Secondly, do they lie or are they simply saying what you don't want to hear - see also: the backfire effect. Thirdly - ok, there is no third point.

But it strikes me we're at this point where we've been warned about the consequences and we ignore them. There is no equality of opinion. But there is an expectation of one. Somehow, the idea none shall be forbidden from having an opinion has become "my opinion is as good as your expertise." Although in the US this has largely been the Trump era's modus operandi, there's no shortage of people fuelling this kind of approach. Let me illustrate the kinds of people pushing this agenda:

Donald Trump - hard right, USA
Bernie Sanders - centre-left, USA
Nigel Farage/UKIP - hard right, UK
Jeremy Corbyn - moderate/hard left, UK
Geert Wilders - moderate right, Netherlands
Marine le Pen - hard right, France
Bill Shorten - centre-left, Australia

What do they have in common besides naked populism? Nothing, ideologically speaking. They are both left and right. But they are politicians astute enough to ride a wave of popular discontent into elections, irresponsibly feeding the beast and sustaining its wildly unrealistic expectations. None would disagree on Trump or Le Pen, but on Sanders or Corbyn they will say no, these people are virtue made flesh! They would never betray us in this fashion!

Thus proving the point.

 

I'd see it as also being closely linked to the notion that if you "believe" something, either positively or negatively, then that automatically grants the object of belief sacred status and thus cannot be questioned, thus:

(delete as applicable).

Being wrong about anything has somehow become deemed the greatest humiliation possible, so people attempt to set things up so the status can never be applied to them.

(Yet it is being in error, being mistaken, throwing out ideas that enables learning, but to wish to learn at all requires an acknowledgement that one does not know it all - which is something else people wish to resist.)

 

Does that then not go to the last paragraph in the above?

Using the microfinance in Kenya example, the author writes ""This illustrates an opportunity of how we're living in this unique moment in time [where we can] redesign institutional systems that are more transparent, more inclusive and more accountable."

But, transparent how?

I'll give you an example.

In our last budget, the government proposed a levy on banks. They went from, both from Labor and the conservatives, obession with removing a budget deficit through spending cuts to raising revenue as a way of entering surplus. A minor positive.

The issue is, the levy on banks has to be passed on. I'll explain why.

The treasurer (think Chancellor of the Exchequer) told banks they mustn't pass it on, but the reality is there are two avenues to do this. One is to increase fees to offset the costs; the other is to hit profits. Now a lot of people will be agreeing profits should have been hit, and rolling their eyes at the greed of the 1% etc etc, socialist claptrap nonsense. And Australian banks are among the most profitable in the world. So of course they should take a hit in their profits to help pay for things (that American companies like Apple and Google won't).

Except, 75-80% of annual profits are distributed to shareholders as dividends. The rest is diverted to capex*. So it's basically rewarding the mum-and-dad investors, and pension funds, who hold bank shares in the first place, and give the banks their market capitalisation (value). The capex expenditure allows them to fund new opportunities which increase profitability - like, say, investing in wind farms in Asia, like my old employer did - which you guessed it - gets funnelled back to shareholders.

(Capex is "capital expenditure" and refers to the line items on a budget that invest earnings into growth opportunities. Its counterpart is opex, or operating expenditure, and this is your more traditional overheads including physical assets like the office, staff salaries, etc).

People are furious at the banks for this stance, but the government knew this would be the outcome. Banks here hold a lot of cash on the balance sheet - but that's a Basel III/ICAAP requirement, resulting from the experiences in the US and UK after the GFC where banks did not hold enough liquid capital to meet their liabilities. So that money is ring fenced for regulatory purposes and subject to periodic stress test scenarios, assessing its adequacy.

Part of the fury is because lifelong unionist and Labor leader, Bill Shorten (who is a bit of a ****) has been importing rhetoric from the US about the GFC. His party praised our banks in 2008-2012 but now they were 'bailed out by the taxpayer' (nope, never happened) and "crooks" (a blue collar term for criminal) who "need to be investigated by a [costly] royal commission" (payback for his union movement being investigated int he same fashion).

So people are angry at this but won't listen to the experts as to why they're being played by the government.

 

I feel like if someone's got a halfway decent education and a little bit of common sense, they ought to be able to figure out who is trustworthy and who is spouting bull****. Amazingly, half of America manages to get it completely backward.

 

Just use RTB and CTB instead of OpEx and CapEx like the kids are doing these days...

 

Pretty much. This was the image I had in mind with that post:



It speaks for itself.

 

Please tell me it is fake....
Please tell me it is fake....

 

That Republican is more "open" to the possibility of global warming than a lot of others I've seen.

 

http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2017/06/1914-effect

The 1914 effect The globalisation counter-reaction
Globalisation is a highly disruptive force. It provoked a reaction in the early 20th century. Are we seeing a repeat?

Buttonwood’s notebook
Jun 14th 2017

by Buttonwood
WHEN the Archduke Franz Ferdinand (pictured right) was assassinated in 1914, there were few initial indications that world war would follow. In retrospect, many people have argued that the killing was a freak event that should not have resulted in the folly of war.
But was the subsequent war really an exogenous event? Or was it the near-inevitable consequence of the tensions resulting from the first great era of globalisation? If Franz Ferdinand had survived, maybe something else would have triggered the conflict. If the latter possibility is right, that may be a warning sign for the current era.
From 1870 to 1914, the first great era of globalisation saw rapid economic growth, trade that grew faster than GDP, mass migration from Europe to theNew Worldand convergence of real wages between the old and new worlds. In Europe, GDP per capita grew more than 70%; in the new world, (Argentina, Australia,Brazil,Canadaand theUnited States) it doubled. Trade grew from 5.9% of global GDP to 8.2%. In many European countries growth was much higher; nearly 15% in theUKand 18% inBelgium. This occurred despite the restoration of tariffs in many countries in the 1880s onwards. Transport costs were falling fast thanks to the railway and the steamship which meant that prices for goods like wheat, iron and copper converged across the western world.
Migration rates were remarkable. In the decade 1901-10, 5% of those fromAustria-Hungaryleft the country, more than 6% of Britons, 7% of the Irish, 8% of Norwegians, and nearly 11% of Italians. Argentina added another 30% to its population, in immigrants alone, in that decade. Europehad lots of workers; the new world not so many. So as the workers moved, real wages nearly doubled in Europe during the period compared with a 50% rise in America.
That globalisation had brought greater prosperity was recognised at the time. Keynes famously said that in 1914

The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages.​

Capital flowed freely. Britain financed the railways of Latin America; France the economic expansion of Russia. In his 1909 book, The Great Illusion, Norman Angell, argued that war between the great powers was futile because of the economic damage it would cause.
And yet in 1914, the great powers “sleepwalked” into war, as one author put it. Globalisation then went into reverse. It wasn’t until the 1960s or 1970s that trade recaptured its share of global GDP or countries like America started to re-open their borders to immigrants in a substantial way. Capital flows weren’t freed until the 1980s. The intervening period saw two world wars and a great Depression.
Globalisation was one of the forces that helped created the First World War because it has profoundly destabilising effects, effects we are also seeing today. In large part globalisation is about the more efficient allocation of resources—labour, capital, even land—and that creates losers. People don’t like change, especially when they lose from it. Clearly, the mid-19th century was a period of enormous change that were not just economic. In America, the industrial north defeated the agricultural south;Germany andItaly became nation states, and the multi-national Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires sunk into terminal decline.
Germany and America were able to catch up and, in the latter’s case, surpass the British economy. The pax Britannica in which Britain supported global trade through its powerful navy and financial system was weakened; the Bank of England needed loans from other central banks when Barings collapsed in 1890.
Industrialisation meant that new sources of power emerged to challenge the old aristocratic elites—industrialists and factory workers. Workers were able to use their muscle to demand more rights and, increasingly, the vote. Elites turned to nationalism as a way of distracting voters from economic issues and shoring up their support. This nationalism led to clashes with the other great powers where their interests diverged; betweenBritainandRussiain Asia;RussiaandAustriain the Balkans;GermanyandFrancein north Africa.
As the powers sought to head off these challenges, they split into the triple entente ofBritain,RussiaandFranceand the triple alliance ofGermany,Austria-HungaryandItaly.Britainworried about the growing economic power ofGermanyand entered a naval race;Germanyworried about the growing power ofRussiaand wanted a war sooner rather than later. Confrontation looked more attractive than collaboration.

Globalisation also meant that events in other part of the world become more important; if anything ought to have been an event in a “far way country of which we know nothing”, it was the assassination of an archduke inSarajevo. But it draggedBritain into a war that ultimately sabotaged its status as a great power.
At the same time, the great powers had to deal with much unrest at home. What George Dangerfield called "The Strange Death of Liberal England" saw a potential civil war inIreland, mass strikes and suffragette protests. The Russian regime nearly fell in 1905. Francewas convulsed by the Dreyfus affair, which divided society as clearly as Brexit or the Trump presidency. And then there were assassinations: Tsar Alexander II, the Italian king, the Spanish prime minister, the Empress of Austria and the American president William McKinley. In some cases, the murderers were immigrants; the clichéd picture of the anarchist with a bomb in hand dates from this era.
To sum up, globalisation disrupted both international power structures and domestic ones. This rapid change caused a reaction that was often violent. World War One was not inevitable but it was unsurprising.
So let us move to the current era of globalisation, during which the export share of global GDP has more than doubled since the 1960s. New economic powers have emerged to challenge American dominance; first,Japan,and nowChinaand potentiallyIndia. Imperial overstretch threatens America as it did Edwardian Britain. The ability and, more recently, willingness of America to act as global policeman has been eroded. Indeed, unlikeBritainin 1914, America is a net debtor not a creditor. Can it holdChina’s ambitions in check in the Pacific, counterbalanceIranand the terrorists of Islamic State in the middle east and deal with a nationalist Russian regime? It seems clear that other powers think it can’t. They are pushing to see whether America will react.
Migration has increased again, not quite to pre-1914 levels but in another direction: from the developing world to the developed. This has led to cultural and economic resentment among voters and imported the quarrels of other countries. We see terrorists on the streets ofLondon,Manchester,ParisandBoston; all inspired by events thousands of miles away. Economic integration means that financial crises can quickly spread; just as American subprime mortgages hit the world in 2008, Chinese bad debt may do so in future.
Within the economy two big changes have occurred. Manufacturing capacity has moved from the developed world toAsia. Technology has rewarded skilled workers and widened pay gaps. Voters have rebelled by turning to parties that reject globalisation. This didn’t happen in France but generally it has made life more difficult for centre-left parties and turned centre-right parties more nativist. America’s Republicans used to be enthusiasts for free trade. Now they have elected Donald Trump.
Just as in the first era, globalisation has disrupted international and domestic power structures. Thankfully this does not mean that another world war is inevitable. But it is easy to imagine regional conflicts: Iranagainst Saudi Arabia, or an American attack on North Korea that provokes a Chinese reaction.
But we will see more resistance to globalisation from governments, as they calculate that voters will reward nativism. Foreign takeovers will be blocked. Domestic companies will be subsidised or favoured in government programmes. Tit-for-tat trade embargoes and tariffs will be imposed; the WTO could come under threat. Immigration will be discouraged, even of high-skilled workers. Populism can emerge from the left (higher taxes and nationalisation) as much as from the right; see Britain.
The real danger is that this a zero-sum game. Governments will appear to grab a larger share of global trade for their own countries. In doing so, they will cause trade to shrink. That might make voters even angrier. From the early 1980s to 2008, most companies could count on a business-friendly political environment in the developed world. But it looks as if that era has ended with the financial crisis. Globalisation has caused another counter-reaction.
The best hope is that technology can deliver the economic growth and rising prosperity voters want. If that happens, these threats will not disappear but they will be much reduced. But for all the hype about new technology, productivity has been sluggish. The omens are not great.

 

Well Ender, doesn't sound like you have a very high regard for the common man anyway...why not just let them eat radioactive ash for a few centuries while they think about where they went wrong?

 

Ender doesn't like anything common: the common man, the common cold, common sense...

 

I'm pretty sure he likes Thomas Paine...

 

Yeah I definitely invented the concerns about the dangers of populism Alpha. Well spotted.